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Recent Developments

State v. Evans:
A Warrantless Search Incident to Arrest Is Constitutional, Regardless of Whether
the Police Intend to Charge the Defendant Upon Apprehension
By Stacey E. Burnett

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that a search
incident to a valid arrest is
constitutional even where the police
had no intention of immediately
charging the suspect. State v. Evans,
352 Md. 496, 732 A.2d 469 (1999).
The court ruled that the trial judge may
not exclude certain cocaine evidence
seized from two accused drug dealers
when the police detained and
searched, but did not "book" them for
possession of illegal drugs. In so
doing, the court concluded that, for a
valid arrest, the police need only
subject a defendant to the officers'
immediate control, based on probable
cause that the suspect committed a
crime. The court reiterated its
position that requiring the police to
intend a formal prosecution of all
apprehended suspects would lead to
the needless waste of police and
judicial resources.
In Evans, the court consolidated
two cases, State v. Evans and State
v. Sykes-Bey, both having similar facts
and identical issues. Evans, 352 Md.
at 501, 732 A.2d at 424. In June of
1994, as part of a police task force
to fight drug activity in Baltimore City,
an undercover officer purchased
drugs from defendant Dwight Evans
("Evans"). Id. at 501, 732 A.2d at
425. Approximately five to ten
minutes after the transaction, other
members of the task force stopped
and searched Evans, seizing cocaine
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and marked money used in the
undercover deal. Id. Although the
police detained Evans to verify his
identity, they did not transport him to
the police station or bring him before
a court commissioner, but instead,
released him. Id. at 502, 732 A.2d
at 452-26. One month after the
incident, Evans was formally charged,
and the grand jury indicted him for
various drug offenses based on
evidence seized from the undercover
operation. Id. at 502, 732 A.2d at
426. Evans moved to suppress the
evidence, arguing that it was illegally
seized because the earlier encounter
with the police did not constitute an
arrest. Id. The trial court denied the
motion, and Evans was subsequently
convicted. Id. at 502-03, 732 A.2d
at 426.
Defendant Charles Sykes-Bey
("Sykes-Bey"), in February of 1994,
encountered a similar undercover
operation, during which an officer
purchased cocaine from an individual
who was with Sykes-Bey. Id. at 504,
732 A.2d at 427. The undercover
agent approached Sykes-Bey for
drugs, but Sykes-Bey told the agent
that he sold only "weight cocaine."
Id. The agent, wanting to buy "dimes"
instead, bought crack cocaine from
Sykes-Bey's compatriot. Id. at 505,
732 A.2d at 427. The police,
immediately thereafter, stopped and
searched Sykes-Bey, and seized the
. cocaine. Id. As with Evans, the

police did not take Sykes-Bey to the
station house, or formally charge him
until approximately one month later.
Id. Sykes-Bey moved to suppress
the seized evidence, claiming that,
because he was not "arrested" prior
to, or contemporaneously with the
search, the evidence was not legally
seized. Id. The trial court denied
the motion and Sykes-Bey was
convicted of various drug offenses.
Id. at 506, 732 A.2d at 428.
The Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland reversed both Evans's
and Sykes-Bey's convictions, holding
that the detention in both situations
did not constitute an arrest, and
therefore, the search was
unconstitutional. Id. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland granted
certiorari on both cases to consider
what constitutes an arrest for
purposes of the search incident to
arrest exception. Id. at 506, 732
A.2d at 428-29.
To address the issue of whether
Evans and Sykes-Bey were arrested
when detained, the court first defined
the term "arrest" as set forth in
Bouldin v. State, 276 Md. 511,350
A.2d 130 (1976). Evans, at 512,
732 A.2d at 430-31. The court·
observed that the Bouldin court
defined an arrest to include the
taking, seizing, or detaining ofanother
person (1) by touching or putting
hands on him; (2) or by any act that
indicates an intention to take him into
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custody and that subjects him to the
actual control and will of the person
making the arrest; or (3) by the
consent of the person to be arrested.
Id. at 513, 732 A.2d at 431 (citing
Bouldin, 276 Md. at 515-16, 350
A.2d at 133). As to whether the
police must intend an immediate
prosecution to make an arrest valid,
the court found no support in either
Bouldin or in other Maryland case
law requiring such intent. Id. at 51314, 732 A.2d at 431. The court
therefore concluded that the intent to
prosecute was not a prerequisite to a
valid arrest. Id. at 514,732 A.2d at
431.
The court next focused on
Sykes-Bey's contention that after
stopping and searching a defendant,
the police must immediately charge the
defendant to effectuate a valid search
incident to an arrest. Id. at 524, 732
A.2dat436-37. Thecourtfoundno
distinction between a "fonnal" arrest
and a "custodial" arrest for the
purpose of invalidating an otherwise
constitutional
search,
but
acknowledged that the terms are used
in similar context by the U.S. Supreme
Court and other courts. Id. The court
further agreed with the dissenting
opinion ofthe court ofspecial appeals
that requiring officers to immediately
charge every person they detain to
transform the detention into a valid
arrest would contradict the principles
behind the Fourth Amendment and
violate public policy. Id. at 524, 732
A.2d at 437.
The court found that a lawful
arrest requires probable cause that a
suspect committed a crime, and a
detention ofthe suspect that subjects

him to the arresting officer's will or
control; the intention of immediately
charging the suspect is not required.
Id. at 515, 732 A.2d at 432.
Applying these elements to the facts
in Evans, the court concluded that the
officers had probable cause to believe
Evans and Sykes-Bey had committed
a crime. Id. The court further found
that because the police detained the
defendants in order to verify their
identities, the defendants were
subjected to the officers' control. Id.
The court therefore held that the
encounters between the police and the
defendants constituted valid arrests.

Id.
The court, having found the
arrests valid, then detennined whether
the searches incident to the arrests
were valid. Id. at 516, 732 A.2d at
432-34. The court reviewed the
long-standing rule that arresting
officers may validly search suspects
incident to an arrest for weapons that
may endanger an officer's safety, and
for evidence ofthe crime that may be
vulnerable to destruction. Id. at 517,
732 A.2d at 432-33 (citing Us. v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 225-26
(1973); Chimel v. California, 396
U.S. 752(1969)). The officer's initial
probable cause for arresting the
suspects, according to the court, is
sufficient for a search incident to the
arrests; the officer does not need any
additional suspicion to believe the
suspect has weapons or evidence.
Id. at516-17, 732 A.2dat433 (citing
Us. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
225-26 (1973)).
The
Evans
court,
acknowledging that its justifications
and requirements for a valid search

incident to arrest may not be identical
to those under the Fourth
Amendment, determined that its
holding incorporates the fimdamental
factors. Id. at 519-20, 732 A.2d at
434 (citing Knowles v. Iowa, U.S.,
119 S. Ct. 484 (1998)). The court
cited several Maryland cases applying
the Fourth Amendment rule that
warrantless searches incident to arrest
are valid for the purpose ofuncovering
weapons and evidence. Id. at 51719, 732 A.2d at 433-34. Therefore,
the court concluded that because the
arrests of Evans and Sykes-Bey were
lawful, the searches incident to the
arrests were valid. Id. at 23-24,732
A.2d at 434.
The holding by the Court of
Appeals in State v. Evans that an
arrest is constitutional even if the
police have no intention of
immediately charging the suspect
comports with both prior Maryland
and federal
constitutional
jurisprudence. By not including the
formal charging process as a
requirement for a valid arrest, the
court in State v. Evans created a
wider range of situations that may be
deemed valid arrests. Accordingly,
searches incident to such arrests will
also be lawful. This rule allows
prosecutors to choose carefully which
suspects to charge by first examining
the strength ofthe evidence obtained
from the search. As a result, suspects
may be subjected to fewer
unnecessary formal arrests and
charging procedures. With fewer
defendants in the system, court
dockets and attorneys' caseloads will
be less burdensome, resulting in a
more efficient criminal justice system.
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